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Systems biology has become a fashionable label for a new generation of large-scale 
 experiments. This Essay explores how classical approaches such as forward genetics fit 
into this emerging framework. There is little doubt that we are wit-
nessing the arrival of the era of systems 
biology. There is a feeling that some-
thing important is going on that may 
shift the intellectual and experimental 
landscape on which we stand. Not that 
we are sure yet precisely what systems 
biology is. Preliminary definitions either 
highlight the conceptual aspects of 
studying complex biological systems 
(e.g., Kirschner, 2005) or focus more 
on the technical approaches of large-
scale data acquisition and integration 
(e.g., Liu, 2005). In any case, systems 
biology has the flavor of something 
far removed from the gory details of 
standard molecular biology. We are 
told that systems biologists see a big-
ger and more holistic picture, and that 
the reductionist approach (studying 
complex systems by investigating only 
their isolated components) may soon 
become old fashioned, boring, and 
perhaps even a little embarrassing.
Although it is true that looking at a bio-
logical problem from a larger perspec-
tive is intuitively interesting, the current 
excitement about systems approaches 
to biological problems raises a number 
of important issues. There appear to 
be certain types of approaches that 
are viewed as synonymous with the 
notion of systems biology. Large-scale 
molecular measurements and compu-
tational modeling are key elements of 
a systems biology experiment. Other 
methods, such as large-scale RNA 
interference (RNAi) screens, have also 
become associated with systems biol-
ogy. One approach that is conspicuous 
by its absence is forward genetics (the 
unbiased screening for genetic muta-
tions causing a phenotype of interest). 
Whereas leading geneticists continue to remind us of the past achievements 
of the genetic approach and of the 
promises that genetic toolboxes hold 
for future research (Nagy et al., 2003; 
Gregan et al., 2005), one generally fails 
to find serious consideration of forward 
genetics in discussions of systems 
biology. Indeed, it is not uncommon 
to hear speakers at systems work-
shops and symposia refer to moving 
from a genetics approach to a systems 
approach. This observation is closely 
related to the perception that systems 
biology is here to replace the so-called 
traditional reductionist strategies. In 
reflecting on these considerations, 
we would like to raise the following 
question: how holistic are large-scale 
molecular experiments, and what is 
the nature of the relationship between 
forward genetics and systems biol-
ogy? To answer these questions, we 
would like to briefly consider three top-
ics: (1) the timing of the transition from 
gene discovery to systems biology, (2) 
the idea of systems biology as an alter-
native to a reductionist scientific land-
scape, and, most importantly, (3) the 
relationship between forward genetics, 
quantitative molecular biology, and the 
systems concept.
The first consideration is rather 
trivial, as revealed by the following 
thought experiment. Currently, muta-
tions in less than 25% of all genes have 
been phenotypically characterized in 
multicellular model organisms such 
as the worm Caenorhabditis elegans, 
the fruit fly Drosophila, and the mouse. 
Let us consider the example of the fruit 
fly genome. Assume that, starting in 
January 2006, the first characteriza-
tions of fly mutants are reported for 
50 new fly genes every month. At this Cell 123, Deceunrealistically rapid rate, January 2021 
will have passed well before all remain-
ing fly genes are described (and that’s 
assuming only one publication per 
gene). Clearly, the era of gene discov-
ery is far from over.
This does not mean that the time 
for an integrative systems approach 
is not ripe; quite the contrary. Geneti-
cists—perhaps more than biochemists, 
physiologists, and cell biologists—have 
been keepers of the myth of the gene 
as the holy grail of biology. As molecular 
genetics took center stage, biological 
processes often became the context in 
which to understand the function of a 
given gene, rather than the other way 
round. Thus, the experimental ques-
tions asked and the conclusions drawn 
became rather gene centric. When 
thinking at the systems level, geneti-
cists should accept that genes only 
matter because they are one of many 
cellular codes. No single gene is more 
or less important than any other, and 
the loss of function of gene x causing 
phenotype X is not itself an interesting 
observation. It is only interesting if we 
can begin to quantitatively explain how 
gene x interacting with genes w, y, and 
z together produce phenotype X in con-
text A but not in context B, and what 
predictive value this interaction has on 
the system. From this perspective, the 
synergistic combination of quantitative 
molecular biology, forward genetics, 
reverse genetics, and computational 
modeling constitutes systems biology 
(e.g., Gunsalus et al., 2005).
Our second consideration relates to 
the perception that, as the star of sys-
tem biology rises, that of reductionism 
must fade. Curiously, however, it is not 
a great achievement per se to approach mber 29, 2005 ©2005 Elsevier Inc. 1173
a given problem more holistically. Most 
visionaries of the past are forgotten 
because their grand ideas and books 
became useless once the pedestrian 
way of experimental science revealed 
their incompatibilities with the facts of 
nature. Science remains the art of the 
solvable. Traveling the systems road, 
we must constantly ask ourselves how 
appropriate the big picture is and how 
adequate the systems approach is to 
the level of the question we are trying to 
answer. The fundamentally new char-
acteristic of systems biology is its way 
of thinking, rather than its way of doing. 
Systems thinking realizes that the phe-
notype of a system (from the shape of 
a cell to an evolutionary stable strategy) 
is the emergent property of the inter-
actions among all of the components 
of this system. Thus, it is neither the 
scale of the system nor the particular 
approach used to arrive at a list of its 
functional components that defines a 
systems approach. In fact, perhaps 
paradoxically, for research driven by 
this concept to succeed, it may be 
necessary first to isolate a reduced 
system to provide an experimentally 
testable hypothesis. For example, to 
understand the molecular changes 
that occur in a cell upon binding of a 
ligand to its receptor, most quantitative 
biologists largely query well-defined in 
vitro cell culture systems, which do not 
necessarily reflect the in vivo responses 
of a complex developing system. Thus, 
for the time being, the practical (as 
opposed to the conceptual) transla-
tion of systems biology is much better 
referred to as large-scale reductionism.
A further complication is that every 
system can be described at numer-
ous levels, but only very few of these 
are relevant to a useful understanding 
of the system. To give an example, the 
early universe, a car engine, and a boa 
constrictor are all products of quantum 
interactions of subatomic particles. Yet 
a quantum description of these interac-
tions is only useful for one of the three 
systems: it can neither tell us if the 
engine is working nor what the snake 
had for lunch. Richard Dawkins refers 
to this necessary feature of scientific 
inquiry as “hierarchical reductionism” 
(Dawkins, 1986). So, although large-
scale measurements are imperative 
for a comprehensive description of the 1174 Cell 123, December 29, 2005 ©2005system, the level at which both meas-
urements and integration occur must 
vary depending on the system being 
studied and the question being asked.
Our third consideration questions 
the assumption that if systems biology 
is holistic, then genetics is reduction-
ist. Let us first have a closer look at the 
“omics” approach. It is now possible to 
measure, with increasing precision and 
in some cases in real time, the molecu-
lar constituents of a system and their 
variations across a series of dynamic 
phenotypic changes. These measure-
ments are collectively referred to as 
“omics” (as in genomics, transcrip-
tomics, proteomics, lipidomics, and so 
on). But not every “omics” experiment 
is systems biology. It depends on the 
question. If the purpose of a microar-
ray experiment, for example, is to iden-
tify a few target genes for a transcrip-
tion factor and then validate the “most 
promising candidates,” then this is not 
systems biology. If, on the other hand, 
the purpose is to describe the global 
transcriptional response of the cell to 
changes in the level, localization, or 
sequence of the transcription factor 
and then ask how the new molecular 
conditions created in the cell interact 
to produce the phenotype, then that 
is systems biology. Thus, the tools put 
constraints on the task at hand, but 
they do not define it. So, what about 
the genetic approach?
We argue that the assumption that 
genetics, and especially forward genet-
ics, is a reductionist approach is simply 
erroneous. Like a microarray experi-
ment, a genetic screen is not itself 
reductionist or holistic. It is the use of 
the genetic toolbox that defines its out-
come. It seems that, by mistaking the 
“omics” wave for the systems approach 
itself, we are forgetting some of the 
most influential systems approaches 
of the past: when Christiane Nusslein-
Volhard and Eric Wieschaus (Nusslein-
Volhard and Wieschaus, 1980) tar-
geted the whole Drosophila genome 
using random mutagenesis to unravel 
the riddle of embryonic pattern forma-
tion, they were doing systems biology. 
Other classical examples include the 
Drosophila screens of Seymour Ben-
zer (for example Hotta and Benzer, 
1972) and the C. elegans screens of 
Sydney Brenner (for example, Hodgkin  Elsevier Inc.and Brenner, 1977). How conceptu-
ally different is a genome-wide forward 
genetic screen from genome-wide 
RNAi screens (reviewed in Friedman 
and Perrimon, 2004)? Today, mouse 
RNAi screens and proteomics meas-
urements can only be done in vitro. As 
such, is a forward genetic screen for 
behavioral defects in the living mouse 
not at least as much, if not more, rel-
evant to systems biology? In general, a 
genetic screen addresses the following 
questions: what is the total number of 
components required to build a given 
phenotype (system) and what is the 
contribution of each of these compo-
nents to the phenotype? To answer 
these questions, genetics assumes 
(correctly) that perturbation of these 
components should result in some 
change in the expression of the phe-
notype. Furthermore, our ever-increas-
ing capacity to visualize and quantify 
subtle and dynamic phenotypes—from 
cell shape to behavior—in live animals 
means future genetic screens will pro-
vide an unprecedented wealth of phys-
iologically relevant information. Genet-
ics is not only compatible with systems 
biology, it is a corner stone of any use-
ful form of it. But if all it takes to remain 
fashionable is a fresh label, “Forward 
Genetomics” might do nicely.
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